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Philosophy and the Sciences
After Kant
MICHELA MASSIMI
1. Preamble: HPS and the troubled marriage between
philosophy and the sciences
On 11th October 2007, at the ﬁrst international conference on
Integrated History and Philosophy of Science (&HPS1) hosted by
the Center for Philosophy of Science in Pittsburgh, Ernan
McMullin (University of Notre Dame) portrayed a rather gloomy
scenario concerning the current relationship between history and
philosophy of science (HPS), on the one hand, and mainstream phil-
osophy, on the other hand, as testiﬁed by a signiﬁcant drop in the
presence of HPS papers at various meetings of the American
Philosophical Association (APA).
Since my research activity falls primarily into the category of
history and philosophy of science, I am delighted to be able to con-
tribute to this volume on Conceptions of Philosophy, by discussing
what I see as the very important role that history and philosophy
of science plays, or ought to play within philosophy. And the afore-
mentioned gloomy depiction of the current relationship between
HPS and philosophy invites some preliminary reﬂections. There is
no doubt, I think, that recent years have witnessed an increasing
gap between the sort of topics and themes pursued by HPS scholars,
and those pursued by their colleagues in mainstream philosophy.
HPS scholars are interested in practicing philosophy by looking at
science and history of science in the ﬁrst place, and by exploring
the speciﬁc ways in which new scientiﬁc ideas and concepts histori-
cally originated and evolved. They think that good philosophy has to
be historically and scientiﬁcally informed. Analytic philosophers
pursue philosophy as a perfectly independent discipline, which
not only does not need to resort to the sciences or to history of
science, but it ought not to, if philosophy has to remain a logically
rigorous and methodologically autonomous discipline (independent
of any historical and scientiﬁc contingency). This gap concerns
methodologies, systems of values, and intellectual priorities: there
could hardly be a more profound gulf. Speciation within a
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population is per se a positive, healthy sign of adaptation to the
environment. But I think that the type of speciation that we are wit-
nessing in history and philosophy of science within philosophy
should not be regarded as a happy parting of the ways. I want to
begin this paper by brieﬂy reminding what is at stake in this
parting of the ways and what both parties risk losing, or, sadly,
have already lost sight of.
Without denying the methodological autonomy of philosophy as a
discipline, we should not forget at the same time that philosophy
began – in the words of Aristotle – with the sense of wonder that men
experience in front of nature. Philosophy ﬂourished for centuries as
the highest expression of men’s strive to understand nature and the
world they lived in. For centuries, philosophy has gone hand in
hand with the sciences. Nor can the sciences dispense with philos-
ophy. In Newton’s time, the name for physics was natural philosophy,
and scientiﬁc discussions on the nature of space, time and gravitation
were entangled with metaphysical debates on nature. Still in
twentieth-century physics, the reception of relativity theory and
quantum mechanics in the works of Einstein, Bohr, Reichenbach,
Weyl and others was entangled with epistemological debates about
a priori knowledge and the nature of physical reality, whereas some
of the most beautiful pages in history of science were written in the
ﬁrst half of the last century by people such as Alexander Koyre´,
who came from Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology, or E´mile
Meyerson, who studied Descartes and Kant as well as being a histor-
ian of chemistry.
These are just a few scattered examples of how fruitful the inter-
action among philosophy, the sciences and, I would add, the
history of science (which seems to me an important ‘third man’ in
this binary relation between philosophy and the sciences), has been
for long time. Speciation is a recent phenomenon of our time.
In this paper I want to go back to what I take to be an important
turning point in the relationship between philosophy and the
sciences, namely to Immanuel Kant. Kant’s critical philosophy
marks probably the highest point in the happy long marriage
between philosophy and the sciences. At the same time, it marks
also a watershed: after Kant, the marriage became increasingly
rocky. The aim of this paper is to offer a historical reconstruction
and a possible (tentative and surely not exhaustive) diagnosis of
why such a happy longmarriage between philosophy and the sciences
went eventually wrong after Kant.
In section 2, I focus onKant’s view on philosophy and the sciences,
from his early scientiﬁc writings to the development of critical
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philosophy and the pressing epistemological problems he felt the
need to address in response to the sciences of his time. In section 3,
I take a look at the relationship between philosophy and the sciences
after Kant in the early nineteenth century: despite the fruitful
Kantian legacy in some of the greatest achievements of nineteenth
century physical sciences, post-Kantian German philosophy began
to signal an increasing divide between philosophy and the sciences.
In section 4, I turn to the relationship between philosophy and the
sciences in the twentieth century. In particular, I pay attention to
three main episodes in twentieth-century philosophy. The ﬁrst
episode is the revival of neo-Kantianism with the Marburg school
of Hermann Cohen and Ernst Cassirer (section 4.1); the second is
the emergence of logical positivism, especially of Rudolf Carnap’s
philosophy of science with its debt and, at the same time, departure
from the neo-Kantian tradition (section 4.2). The third signiﬁcant
episode is Thomas Kuhn’s establishment of HPS as a new ﬁeld or
sub-ﬁeld of philosophy, and the consequences that it still has for
HPS as is practised today. I conclude the paper (section 5)
by foreshadowing what I hope to be a better future for the philosophy
and the sciences of the twenty-ﬁrst century (and for HPS itself as a
subject area that investigates the relationship between philosophy and
the sciences) by recovering what I take to be the most important
Kantian insight in this respect. Namely, that epistemology should be
informed by the scientiﬁc preoccupations of our time, as much as phil-
osophy of science should rediscover the Kantian epistemological soul
that it has long lost.
2. Kant on philosophy and the sciences
For centuries, philosophy and natural sciences went hand in hand.
Newton called his masterpiece Philosophiae naturalis principia math-
ematica to indicate that his aim was to investigate the mathematical
principles of what at the time was still called natural philosophy. It
is within this Galilean–Newtonian tradition that we can ﬁnd some
paradigmatic examples of the fruitful two-way relationship between
philosophy and the sciences. Immanuel Kant is one of those paradig-
matic examples. Kant was educated within this Galilean–Newtonian
tradition, and in all his writings there is a constant reference to
Newton’s natural philosophy as the highest example of the secure
foundations achieved by the physical sciences of his time. Kant’s
intense and life-long engagement with the sciences of his time
which I am going to brieﬂy summarise in what follows – from his
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pre-critical writings to his critical period up to his last and incomplete
work published in the Opus postumum – testiﬁes to what is probably
one of the highest points in the troubled marriage between philos-
ophy and the sciences.
In the pre-critical period,1 Kant composed twenty-ﬁve works, of
which several on physics and astronomy. Most of these pre-critical
works focussed on the then ongoing lively debates concerning phys-
ical sciences. For instance, Kant’s very ﬁrst work back in 1747
entitled Thoughts on the true estimation of Living Forces (1747)
addressed one of the most debated topics at the time: namely, the
physical concept of vis viva (the ancestor of the current concept of
kinetic energy), which Leibniz deﬁned as the product of mass times
squared velocity, by correcting Descartes’s deﬁnition in terms of
mass times velocity. Eight years later, in 1755, Kant wrote another
scientiﬁc essay entitled Universal Natural History and Theory of the
Heavens, which was bound to have a long-lasting impact in the
history of astronomy because of the introduction of the so-called
‘nebular hypothesis’.2 The key idea, later expanded by Laplace in
1796 and now known as the Kant–Laplace hypothesis, was that the
universe and the galaxies in it originated from a nebula (a rotating
cloud of gases that expanded and gradually cooled down) according
to the fundamental laws of physics, in particular Newton’s laws as
the expression of God’s divine providence, Although kant legged to
differ from Newton on the exact role of God in the constitution of
the universe.
Even more interesting for the relationship between philosophy and
the sciences of his time was the theme of Physical Monadology
(1756).3 With this work Kant intervened in the then heated debate –
triggered by the Berlin Academy of Sciences Prize Question for
1745–7-between the Leibnizians–Wolfﬁans, on the one hand, and
the Newtonian Pierre Maupertuis, on the other hand, on the speciﬁc
theme as to whether Leibniz’s monadology was compatible with the
Newtonian idea of inﬁnite divisibility of space and time. Kant’s orig-
inal proposal was to try to reconcile the Newtonian idea of the inﬁnite
divisibility of space with a physical monadology that regarded
monads as physical point-like centers of attractive and repulsive
forces ﬁlling a space, rather than as Leibnizian metaphysical
1 By ‘pre-critical period’, it is usually intended the period preceding
Kant’s Inaugural Dissertation in 1770, when he was appointed Professor
of Logic and Metaphysics at the University of Ko¨nigsberg.
2 Kant (1755a).
3 Kant (1756).
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substances occupying a ﬁnitely divisible space.4 If the theme of this
early writing is per se already symptomatic of Kant’s engagement
both with mainstream (Leibnizian–Wolfﬁan) metaphysics and with
the physics of his time, on the other hand, the far-reaching conse-
quences of Kant’s original attempt to reconcile the two are even
more extraordinary. Indeed, Kant’s take on physical monads antici-
pated the dynamical theory of matter that he developed later in
1786 in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, and that
was bound to have a huge impact in the development of the physical
sciences of nineteenth century from Oersted to Faraday, as we shall
see in the next section.
With the Inaugural Dissertation of 1770, entitled Concerning the
Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World, which
marks a watershed in Kant’s philosophy, Leibnizian metaphysics
and Newtonian science are ﬁnally disentangled. Against both the
Newtonian and the Leibnizian tradition and their respective attempts
to reconcile physics with a metaphysics of space, time, and physical
substances, Kant’s critical philosophy for the very ﬁrst time intro-
duced a distinction between the faculty of sensible cognition and
the faculty of intellectual cognition, and relegated the monadic
realm to the second, and space and time as autonomous forms of sen-
sible intuition to the former.
With the beginning of Kant’s critical period, the relationship
between philosophy and the sciences was completely reconsidered.
The task for Kant was no longer to reconcile physical discoveries
with metaphysical debates on the nature of space, time, and physical
4 To this purpose, Kant resorted to a slightly modiﬁed proof already
present in the Introduction to Natural Philosophy by the Newtonian John
Keill (1726). The idea of physical monads was at odds with Leibnizian–
Wolfﬁan metaphysics, according to which monads are indeed constituted
by primitive active and passive forces which are however distinct from
derivative active and passive forces at work in the dynamics of moving
bodies (Leibniz’s Specimen dynamicum, and Wolff Cosmologia generalis
§§183–4. I thank Silvia De Bianchi for helpful research collaboration on
this issue). As Watkins (2005), 70 notes, the main problem for Leibniz
was to try to harmonize ‘the realm of ﬁnal causality’ (monads) with the
‘realm of efﬁcient causality’ (bodies), i.e. the ‘freedom of monads with the
determinism of bodies’. Watkins goes on to claim that the idea of monads
as physical points, and not just metaphysical substances, was defended on
the other hand by Martin Knutzen, who was Kant’s teacher although the
relationship between the two was not very rosy and polemic references to
Knutzen can be found in Kant (1747). On the Kant–Knutzen relationship,
see Beiser (1992), Scho¨nfeld (2006), and Kuehn (2001).
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substances. Instead, the main task for Kant’s critical philosophy
became that of explaining and justifying how the very successful
mathematical-physical sciences of his time were possible, by looking
at the conditions of possibility of our scientiﬁc knowledge of nature.
The answer thatKantgave to thisquestion iswell-known:our scientiﬁc
knowledge of nature is the serendipitous result of applying pure con-
cepts of the faculty of understanding to ‘appearances’, intended as
the conceptually still undetermined spatio-temporal objects as given
to the mind in empirical intuition. If the task of critical philosophy
was to explain why we have achieved such secure foundations in the
mathematics and natural sciences of the time, the answer that critical
philosophy gave to this epistemological question relied on the way in
which our mind contributes to our scientiﬁc knowledge, by projecting
ontonature a priori forms of sensibility such as space and time aswell as
a priori principles of the understanding, such as for instance causality.
It is not my aim in this paper to enter into the details ofKant’s criti-
cal philosophy. Instead, since the topic of this paper is to analyse
the relationship between philosophy and the sciences after Kant,
I simply want to highlight some points which I deem relevant to this
topic. First, as the above short remarks about Kant’s pre-critical writ-
ings show, we can legitimately regardKant’s critical philosophy as the
ﬁnal outcome of Kant’s life-long commitment to both the philosophy
and the sciences of his time (namely, toLeibniz–Wolffmetaphysics on
the one hand, andNewtonian physics, on the other hand). Second, the
original solution that Kant gave to the problem of how to reconcile the
two, consisted in relegating traditional metaphysical debates to the
noumenal realm and redeﬁning the role of philosophy as mainly
centred around the epistemological questions of ‘how is pure math-
ematics possible?’ and ‘how is pure natural science possible?’. Kant’s
transcendental method starts from the fact of science and traces it
back to the conditions of possibility of our scientiﬁc knowledge.
Indeed, the exact sciences continued to play a key role inKant’s critical
philosophy as the very source of inspiration and motivation for his
entire epistemological project.
No wonder Kant opened the Preface to the second edition of the
Critique of Pure Reason (1787) by programmatically linking his
Copernican turn to the work of scientists such as Galileo, Torricelli
and Stahl:
When Galileo rolled balls of a weight chosen by himself down an
inclined plane, (. . .) a light dawned on all those who study nature.
They comprehended that reason has insight only intowhat it itself
produces according to its own design; that it must take the lead
280
Michela Massimi
with principles for its judgements according to constant laws and
compel nature to answer its questions, rather than letting nature
guide its movements by keeping reason, as it were, in leading-
strings; for otherwise accidental observations (. . .) can never
connect up into a necessary law, which is yet what reason seeks
and requires. Reason, in order to be taught by nature, must
approach nature with its principles in one hand, (. . .) and, in
the other hand, the experiments thought out in accordance
with these principles – yet in order to be instructed by nature
not like a pupil, who has recited to him whatever the teacher
wants to say, but like an appointed judge who compels witnesses
to answer the questions he puts to them. (. . .) This is how
natural science was ﬁrst brought to the secure course of a science
after groping about for so many centuries.5
Galileo is here portrayed as the scientist who paradigmatically accom-
plished the revolutionary shift that Kant was urging for in epistem-
ology: namely, the shift from the view that our scientiﬁc knowledge
proceeds from nature itself (i.e. that what we believe there is proceeds
from what there is, which is the very source of the problem of knowl-
edge) to the opposite Kantian view, according to which ‘we can
cognize of things a priori only what we ourselves have put into
them’.6 The certainty and secure foundation achieved by natural
science from the time of Galileo onwards is – to Kant’s eyes – the
paradigmatic expression of this shift. Reason must approach nature
with its principles on the one hand, and with experiments thought
out in accordance with these principles, on the other hand.7 And
the task of transcendental philosophy is to clarify what are the
principles that make our scientiﬁc knowledge of nature possible.
Thus, by asking how pure natural science is possible, Kant was trying
to justify why we do in fact have a science of nature from the time of
Galileo onwards. It is from this particular perspective – I want to
suggest – that we can read Kant’s entire philosophical enterprise from
the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (1786) until his last
incomplete work ‘Transition from the Metaphysical Foundations of
Natural Science to Physics’ published in theOpus postumum.
5 Kant (1781, 1787); Eng. transl. (1997)Critique of Pure Reason, Preface
to the second edition, B xiii–xiv. Emphasis added.
6 Ibid. Bxviii.
7 I have explored this point in Massimi (2008b) in relation to what I
think is Kant’s new conception of phenomena and its relevance to current
debates in philosophy of science.
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In the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (1786) Kant
expressly tried to latch the transcendental apparatus developed in the
Critique of Pure Reason onto the physical sciences of his time,
namely Galilean–Newtonian physics, so as to provide a justiﬁcation
for its secure foundations.8 The task of this fundamental work is to
show how the empirical concept of matter can be schematised accord-
ing to the table of categories developed in the Transcendental Analytic
of the Critique of Pure Reason, i.e. namely according to the four
categories of quantity, quality, relation andmodality. Hence, four cor-
responding chapters entitled respectively Metaphysical Foundations
of Phoronomy, Dynamics, Mechanics and Phenomenology. And
while the chapter on Phoronomy investigates matter as a mathematical
point-like movable in space endowed exclusively with a certain ‘quan-
tity of motion’ (namely, speed and direction), in the following chapter
‘Metaphysical Foundations of Dynamics’, Kant deﬁned the empirical
concept of matter according to the category of quality as the movable
that ﬁlls a space through a particular moving force. More precisely, he
introduced a priori attractive and repulsive forces (which featured
already in the 1756 Physical Monadology) as two fundamental
moving forces, through which matter can ﬁll a space by either
causing other bodies to approach it or to be removed from it. Kant
derived these two fundamental moving forces a priori from two basic
properties of matter, namely its impenetrability and its ability to
strive to enlarge the space that it ﬁlls so as to counteract the opposite
tendency expressed by the repulsive force.
The a priori introduction of these two fundamental moving forces
paves the way to the chapter on Mechanics, where Kant reformulated
Newton’s three laws ofmotion, includingNewton’s second law,which
is regarded as instantiating the category of causality (whereby the
impressed force is the cause of change in the inertial state of the
system). Finally, in the fourth chapter onPhenomenology, the empiri-
cal concept ofmatter as themovable in space is deﬁned according to the
categoryofmodality.Kant’s aimwas to showhow to transformappear-
ance (Erscheinung) into experience (Erfahrung); more precisely, how to
8 Michael Friedman has discussed in detail Kant’s project in the
Metaphysical Foundations as strictly related to, and almost an instantiation
of Kant’s epistemological stance in the Critique of Pure Reason (see
Friedman 1992a, 1992b). For an alternative reading of Kant’s project in
the Metaphysical Foundations that disentangles the enduring signiﬁcance
of Kant’s philosophy from the fortunes of Newtonian mechanics, see
Buchdahl (1969a), (1969b), (1974); for a similar line of argument, see also
Allison (1994).
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transform apparentmotions into truemotions.According toFriedman,9
since Kant rejected Newton’s view on absolute space and time, he
needed to ﬁnd a way of explaining true or absolute motions without
resorting to absolute space as a privileged reference frame.Kant’s strat-
egy consisted in identifying the centre of mass of our solar system as a
privileged reference frame. To this purpose, he needed to derive
Newton’s law of gravitation, responsible for the planetary motions in
the solar system, as a necessary and universal feature of matter as the
movable in space.
Without going any further into this discussion, the point I want to
stress is that following Friedman’s reading, in the Metaphysical
Foundations of Natural Science Kant was trying to give an answer
to the epistemological question ‘how is pure natural science possible?’
by looking at the speciﬁc way in whichNewton’s three laws of motion
and the law of gravitation could be justiﬁed within the conceptual
apparatus of Kant’s transcendental philosophy.
In this respect, the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science
occupies a central role in the history of epistemological naturalism,
namely in the view according to which answers to the problem of
knowledge can be found by drawing on natural sciences
(especially, the physical sciences as historically developed from the
time of Galileo and Newton onwards). Kant’s epistemological
naturalism10 starts with the questions ‘what is knowledge?’, ‘how
9 Friedman (1992a), ch. 4, on which I draw here.
10 A terminological clariﬁcation is in order here. I shall henceforth refer
to Kant’s ‘epistemological naturalism’ in the speciﬁc sense clariﬁed above:
namely, that answers to the problem of knowledge should be found by
drawing on the natural sciences and on their history. If we want to under-
stand how knowledge is possible, we should investigate how the very suc-
cessful sciences of the time (Galilean–Newtonian mechanics) were
possible, in the ﬁrst place. Kant’s epistemological project was patterned
upon the sciences of his time. This is what I mean here – in a somehow
liberal sense – by ‘epistemological naturalism’. The term should not be con-
fused with a more common usage of the expression in contemporary
(post-Quinean) epistemology to indicate that epistemology should be natur-
alised, and become a chapter of cognitive psychology (see Quine’s seminal
work (1969), and Laudan (1990), Kitcher (1992) for more recent discussions
of the topic). Kant never endorsed what we now call ‘naturalised epistem-
ology’: for him, human thought has a fundamentally normative role that
cannot be clariﬁed in terms of any naturalistic description. As Hatﬁeld
(1990), 17 has pointed out, for Kant ‘empirical or natural-scientiﬁc descrip-
tion of the mind [is] irrelevant to the discovery and application of standards
of epistemic valuation’. On the other hand, this was precisely the path
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is scientiﬁc knowledge of nature possible?’. The pursuit of these epis-
temological questions led him naturally to the sciences and to
philosophy of science in the attempt to understand the growth of
scientiﬁc knowledge from the time of Galileo onwards.
If physical sciences, in particular the Galilean–Newtonian tra-
dition, is Kant’s main concern in the Metaphysical Foundations of
Natural Science, on the other hand in the ﬁnal period of his career
and life Kant somehow went back to a series of problems that occu-
pied him already in his early (mid-1750s) works, in particular new
discovery in experimental physics and chemistry about combustion,
cohesion of solids, and changes of physical state. And if back in
1786, he had dismissed chemistry as a ‘systematic art’ rather than a
proper science, nowKant’s awareness of Lavoisier’s chemical revolu-
tion at the turn of the century, and of the then fashionable theories of
caloric and ether as the substances for heat and light, features clearly
in his last and never completed work entitled ‘Transition from the
Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science to Physics’, published
as part of the Opus postumum.11
In this last work, which in Kant’s intention was meant to ﬁll a gap
he felt was still open in his transcendental philosophy after the
Critique of Judgment, Kant claimed that in order to complete the tran-
sition from the metaphysical foundations of natural science to
followed after Kant by Hermann von Helmholtz’s empirical research on the
physiology of spatial perception.
11 Friedman (1992a), ch. 5, has illuminatingly pointed out how
Lavoiser’s chemical revolution, and the recent discoveries of pneumatic
chemistry underlie and prompted the ‘Transition’, whose speciﬁc aim was
to bridge the gap between the Metaphysical Foundations on the one hand,
and the vast realm of empirical forces recently discovered, on the other
hand. In addition to Friedman’s analysis, it must be noted that although
the characterization of ether as Wa¨rmestoffe, i.e. as a medium for the trans-
mission of heat, betrays Kant’s attempt to reconcile Lavoisier’s caloric with
ether theories, Kant’s use of the ether as a medium for the transmission of
attractive and repulsive forces is to be found already in Kant (1755a) and
(1755b), with some clear echoes of Newton’s analogous use of the ether in
the second edition of Principia (1713) and most importantly in the 2nd
English edition of Optics (1717). I have investigated the inﬂuence of the
Newtonian experimentalism of Opricks, and of the ensuing British and
Dutch Natural Philosophy of Stephen Hales and Herman Boerhaave, for
Kant (1755a) and (1755b) in an paper currently under preparation. It is as
if the last Kant of the Opus postumum felt the need to go back to some phys-
ical problems that originally prompted his philosophical investigation back
in the 1750s.
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physics, it was not enough to establish a priori attraction and
repulsion as two fundamental moving forces in nature. It was not
enough because there remains a gap between postulating these
two fundamental moving forces in nature from a metaphysical
point of view, on the one hand, and accounting for the wide range
of speciﬁc empirical properties of matter discovered by the chemical
revolution by the end of eighteenth century, on the other hand.
Hence the necessity to bridge the gap between the all-encompassing
metaphysical framework canvassed in the Metaphysical Foundations
on the one hand, and the multifarious range of more speciﬁc empiri-
cal properties ofmatter that natural scientists were discovering, on the
other hand.
This is the speciﬁc task that Kant aimed to accomplish with the
‘Transition to Physics’, where by physics Kant meant ‘the systematic
investigation of nature as to empirically given forces of matter, insofar
as they are combined among one another in one system’ (22: 298).
The main concern of the ‘Transition’ was then to justify and
ground bottom-up a system of empirically given forces in nature. The
problem is that in nature we may observe objects moving in space
and time, changing physical state (from solid to liquid to gaseous)
or displaying some properties (e.g. being elastic). But these are only
appearances [Erscheinungen]. Only when we introduce moving
forces as the underlying causes that make the objects move in space,
or change their physical state or displaying some physical or chemical
properties, do we have a conceptually determined appearance or
phenomenon as the proper object of scientiﬁc knowledge. Once
again, the category of causality was regarded as crucial in our scienti-
ﬁc understanding of a variety of physical phenomena involving
moving forces (e.g. forces responsible for the solidiﬁcation, liquefac-
tion, elasticity, and cohesion of objects).12 Thus, still in this last and
incomplete work, Kant was striving to implement and extend his
transcendental apparatus well beyond Newtonian physics to include
pneumatic chemistry, theories of heat and light, and even biological
theories of his time.13
12 I have investigated the relevance of the ‘Transition’ in relation to a
Kantian conception of phenomena and current debates in philosophy of
science, in Massimi (2008b).
13 For an alternative analysis of Kant’s project in the ‘Transition’, and
his proof of the existence of the ether as part of his search for a replacement
of his earlier dynamic theory of matter – exposed in the Metaphysical
Foundations – see Fo¨rster (2000).
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To sum up, with Immanuel Kant epistemology, or better what
became later known as Erkenntnistheorie14 acquired a central role in
philosophy: analyses of the transcendental conditions for human
knowledge replaced time-honoured metaphysical discussions about
the nature of time and space triggered by Newtonian science and
the Leibniz–Clarke debate. But the normative role of epistemology
in tackling the problem of knowledge is – in Kant’s view-intrinsically
related to the role of the sciences as exemplars of human knowledge.
Kant’sepistemological naturalism is entangledwith andultimately
leads into philosophy of science: the latter is necessary to accom-
plish the normative task of the former.
I take this as the greatest Kantian insight that unfortunately both
current epistemologists and philosophers of science in the
Anglo-American world seem to have lost sight of. From the 1930s
onwards, in the Anglo-American world, knowledge was identiﬁed
with justiﬁed true belief, and the task of epistemology was no
longer to investigate the ‘fact of science’ so as to ﬁnd the transcenden-
tal conditions for human knowledge, but rather to investigate the
logical structure and syntax of language so as to ﬁnd the sufﬁcient
conditions for beliefs to count as knowledge. In the rest of this
paper, I attempt a diagnosis of how we got to this stage of detaching
epistemology from philosophy of science and hence from science
itself. I believe that despite the revival of naturalized epistemology
in the second half of twentieth-century, there remains a gap
between the philosophy and the sciences that has never been
bridged since the time of Kant. And the ﬁrst signs of this increasing
gap became soon evident in the Kant aftermath, at the beginning of
the nineteenth century.
3. Philosophy and the sciences after Kant.
The nineteenth century
In this section, I take a brief look at some salient aspects of the
relationship between philosophy and the sciences after Kant, with a
focus on two main aspects of the Kantian legacy for the nineteenth
century. The ﬁrst concerns the impact that Kant’s philosophy of
14 As Caygill (1995), 176 points out ‘theGerman termErkenntnistheorie
(theory of knowledge) often translated as epistemology is (. . .) post-Kantian
and was coined by K.L. Reinhold as part of his attempt to transform the
critical philosophy into a theory of representation in Letters on the
Kantian Philosophy (1790–2).’
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science had for the developments of the nineteenth-century physical
sciences. The second is more directly related to the end of Kant’s
epistemological naturalism, i.e. his project of tackling the problem
of knowledge by taking the sciences as exemplars of human knowl-
edge, in the post-Kantian German tradition. Let us take a look at
the ﬁrst of these two aspects.
Historians and philosophers of science have recently begun to
pay more attention to the impact of Kant’s philosophy of science
for nineteenth-century physical sciences.15 One of the most signiﬁ-
cant implications was the role that Kant’s dynamic theory of
matter played for the movement known as Naturphilosophie that
developed mainly around Friedrich von Schelling’s two main
works Ideas towards a philosophy of nature (1797) and First Outline
of a System of Philosophy of Nature (1799). As mentioned in the
previous section, following Friedmans analysis, in the Metaphysical
Foundations of Natural Science Kant identiﬁed two fundamental
moving forces in nature: a repulsive force responsible for matter’s
impenetrability and an attractive force counterbalancing the repulsive
force. Kant’s aim was to start with these two a priori established
moving forces to provide a top-down justiﬁcation for his three laws
of mechanics. Kant saw the three laws of motion as ultimately
grounded on the transcendental principles of substance, causality
and reciprocity and on the constitutive role these principles play
for experience. This top-down procedure ﬁnds its natural counterpart
in a bottom-up procedure that Kant developed from the Critique
of Judgment (1790) to the ‘Transition from the Metaphysical
Foundations of Natural Science to Physics’ in the Opus postumum.
According to this alternative bottom-up procedure, we should start
instead from empirically given forces of matter and empirical laws,
such as those that the chemical revolution was discovering at the
end of eighteenth century, and try to subsume them under higher
level yet still empirical laws so as to seek after a system of forces in
nature. Systematicity or systematic unity in the investigation of
nature was presented as an open-ended, regulative (as opposed to con-
stitutive) principle of scientiﬁc inquiry. It is precisely this distinction
between constitutive versus regulative principles, which in Kant
runs parallel to the distinction between the faculty of understanding
15 For the multifarious aspects of the Kantian legacy for nineteenth-
century physical sciences, see the excellent anthology by Michael
Friedman and Alfred Nordmann (2006), on which I draw here (for a
review of this volume, see Massimi 2008a).
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and the faculty of reason or reﬂective judgment16 that the
Naturphilosophen dismantled.
The Naturphilosophen rejected the dualism between constitutive
and regulative principles, and gave a constitutive twist to the regula-
tive principle of systematicity. While Kant stressed systematicity as a
regulative principle that the mind projects upon nature, Schelling
saw nature itself as systematic and ordered. The speculative physics
championed by Naturphilosophen regarded nature as productivity,
i.e. as natura naturans (as opposed to natura naturata). This idea of
nature as productivity prompted an investigation of forces in nature
as the causes of variety of phenomena.
The Naturphilosophen extended Kant’s dynamic theory of matter
well beyond what Kant had envisaged: for them, nature as a whole
dialectically evolved from the inert/lifeless matter described by
Kant into the variety of forms described by contemporary chemistry
and biology. Under the inﬂuence of the Romantics (from Goethe to
Novalis) and inﬂuenced by the new electrochemistry, Schelling
extended Kant’s theory of matter beyond attraction and repulsion
and regarded magnetic, electrical and galvanic forces as a dialectical
development of these two fundamental forces of matter.17 The
search for interconversion processes in the name of the unity and pro-
ductivity of nature was open, and became a dominant theme of
nineteenth-century physical sciences. The interconversion of electri-
cal and magnetic phenomena is one example.
Indeed, Schelling’s reinterpretation of Kant in his System of
Transcendental Idealism (1800) had important implications for the
history of electromagnetism in the early nineteenth century. Hans
Christian Oersted’s pioneering discovery in 1820 that the passage of
electric current in a wire could twist sideways a magnetic needle
marks the beginning of electromagnetic theory. Oersted was deeply
inﬂuenced by Schelling, who he came to know via Johann W. Ritter,
and even more so by Kant’s own dynamic theory of matter that was
16 In theCritique of Pure Reason, in the Appendix to theTranscendental
Dialectic, Kant defended systematicity as a regulative principle of the
faculty of reason; but in the Introduction of the Critique of Judgment the
very same regulative principle was re-assigned to the faculty of reﬂective
judgment as the faculty responsible for subsuming the particular under
the universal.
17 For an excellent analysis of how Naturphilosophie expanded some
Kantian themes and at the same time inﬂuenced some physical discoveries
see Gower (1973); and Friedman (2006).
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the subject of his doctoral dissertation.18 Moreover, he attended
Fichte’s lectures in Berlin and Friederich Schlegel’s lecture at Jena.
Some historians of science have even stressed the inﬂuence that the
GermanNaturphilosophie had in the English-speaking world through
Samuel Taylor Coleridge, who was a disciple of Kant in his stay in
Germany at the end of eighteenth century, and back in England, alleg-
edly inspired his friend Humphry Davy and via Davy, Michael
Faraday, who worked for Davy at the Royal Institution in London.19
It is no surprise then that Faraday’s discovery of electromagnetic
induction in 1831 was welcomed by Schelling as vindicating the
Naturphilosophiemanifesto of nature as productivity.
Electromagnetism is not the only example of howKant’s philosophy
of science, via Schelling’s reformulation, had an impact on the physical
sciences of the nineteenth century. The interconversion of heat and
mechanical work expressed by the ﬁrst law of thermodynamics –
jointly discovered by Julius Robert Mayer, Hermann von Helmholtz
and James Prescott Joule in the 1840s – is another eloquent example.
While the link between Mayer and Naturphilosophie has become a
debated issue in history of science after Thomas Kuhn’s seminal
article ‘Energy conservation as an example of simultaneous discovery’
in the late 1950s,20 a more robust historical link between
Naturphilosophie and Hermann von Helmholtz, whose father was a
close friend of Fichte, has generally been recognised.21
But the Kantian legacy for nineteenth-century science is not con-
ﬁned to the interconversion processes at work in electromagnetism
and thermodynamics. It extends also to more theoretical aspects of
mathematical physics in the works of Jakob F. Fries’ The
Mathematical Philosophy of Nature (1822).22 In the same
18 On Schelling’s inﬂuence on Oersted’s discovery of electromagnetism
see Friedman (2006). Shanahan (1989) argues that Oersted owed more to
Kant than toNaturphilosophie. He had to study Kant as part of the curricu-
lum in natural philosophy at the University of Copenhagen and indeed
wrote his doctoral dissertation on Kant’s Metaphysical Foundations of
Natural Science.
19 The Kant-Coleridge-Davy-Faraday connection is advocated by the
historian Williams (1965), (1973), and questioned by the historian Caneva
(1997).
20 Reprinted in Kuhn (1977), 66–104. Against Kuhn’s claim that
Naturphilosophie was an important factor in Mayer’s discovery of energy
conservation, see Caneva (1993), ch. 7.
21 For the inﬂuence of Naturphilosophie on von Helmholtz see Cahan
(1993), ch. 7 and 12.
22 See Pulte (2006).
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aforementioned spirit of rejecting the constitutive/regulative distinc-
tion and afﬁrming the priority of the regulative over the constitutive,
Fries saw Euler and Lagrange’s principles of analytical mechanics as
the result of a bottom-up approach for systematizing mechanical
experience before any constitutive principle could be found and
any forces of matter identiﬁed. Even more striking is the impact of
Kant’s Transcendental Aesthetic for the discovery of
non-Euclidean geometries. For Kant, the universal and necessary
status of Euclidean geometry could be traced back to the fact that
objects are given to the mind in empirical intuition according to
space and time as a priori forms of sensibility. Hermann von
Helmholtz challenged Kant on the allegedly necessary status of
Euclidean geometry by showing that what makes space seem
Euclidean is a series of sense-impressions about the free mobility of
rigid bodies and paths of light rays, and the very same empirical evi-
dence can acquaint us with the structure of a non-Euclidean space;
hence the non-necessary status of Euclid’s ﬁfth postulate. In this
way, Helmholtz’s empiricism paved the way to Poincare´’s conven-
tionalism about geometry, and to non-Euclidean geometries in rela-
tivity theory in the twentieth century.23
While the Naturphilosophen rejection of the regulative versus con-
stitutive distinction and emphasis on the unity of nature opened
undreamt-of avenues for the physical sciences, on the other hand, it
also engendered a swirl of new philosophical problems. One of the
central tenets of post-Kantian German idealism, from Schelling to
Fichte to Hegel, was the rejection of Kant’s distinction between the
faculty of sensibility and the faculty of understanding. For Kant,
the distinction between these two faculties was central to understand
how nature as given to us in sensible receptivity could become an
object of scientiﬁc knowledge. And, for Kant, the answer to the
problem of knowledge was to be found in the way in which concepts
of the faculty of understanding are ‘schematised’ and applied to
spatiotemporal objects of the faculty of sensibility (namely, to
‘appearances’ as given to the mind in empirical intuition according
to a priori forms of space and time).
In the hands of post-Kantian German idealists, Kant’s interplay of
the faculty of sensibility and the faculty of understanding received a
new twist, and the contribution of the faculty of sensibility was sig-
niﬁcantly downplayed. Nature was increasingly regarded as
embedded in the conceptual realm, and eventually as the historicized
23 For the link between Kant, Helmholtz’s empiricism and Poincare´’s
conventionalism, see DiSalle (2006a) 55–72, (2006b).
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manifestation of the dialectical development of the spirit, according
to Hegel. But it is not just the faculty of sensibility that was down-
played to emphasise the conceptual aspect of human knowledge
over and above the contribution of sensibility. The same faculty of
understanding was in turn downplayed with respect to the faculty
of reason. For Kant, there was an important difference between
understanding and reason: the former is the realm of constitutive prin-
ciples that enter in thewaywe constitute experience by ‘schematizing’
concepts (i.e. by applying them to spatio-temporal appearances);
reason, on the other hand, is the realm of regulative principles that
provide open-ended and never achievable ideals, towards which we
should strive in our scientiﬁc knowledge of nature. We have already
mentioned that a distinctive feature of Naturphilosophie was the pre-
eminence assigned to regulative principles over constitutive ones.
A consequence of this shift was precisely the aforementioned devel-
opment of a new dynamic theory of matter that – in the name of the
regulative principle of systematicity – took nature as natura naturans
developing dialectically from polar forces. This very same shift,
however, had also the effect of opening a gulf between philosophy
and the sciences. The historicized, dialectical development of
human reason, in conjunction with the downplay of the Kantian
faculty of sensibility, meant that knowledge of nature was no longer
secured by the Kantian interplay of intuitions and concepts; but
rather by the spontaneous activity and dialectical unfolding of
human reason itself.
The problem of bridging the gap between what we believe there is
and what there is was no longer tackled through Kant’s Copernican
turn of making appearances conform to our way of representing.
Instead, our way of representing became all there is. The very same
dichotomy between us as epistemic agents and the external world
as an object of knowledge disappeared in post-Kantian German
idealism. And with it, the problem of knowledge that had haunted
epistemological naturalism from Hume to Kant also disappeared.
Or better, in its place now there was a new problem: that of the
unbounded autonomy of human reason in its historicised unfolding.
The immediate effect of this idealistic twist was of course that the
scientiﬁc preoccupations that had triggered Kant’s Copernican turn
were put to rest for some time. The aim of philosophy – for
post-Kantian German idealism – was no longer to explain how we
can have scientiﬁc knowledge of nature. Nor is the aim of science
to provide an exemplar of human knowledge: the post-Kantian ideal-
istic tradition rediscovered the importance of the arts and humanities
(from music to art) as exemplars of human knowledge alternative to
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the sciences. Hence the ensuing debate between Naturwissenschaften
and Geisteswissenschaften that became so typical of German
philosophy.
But it is from within this idealistic tradition that at the end of nine-
teenth century and beginning of the twentieth century a new move-
ment developed, whose primary aim was to rediscover the problem
of knowledge and to return to Kant’s epistemological project and to
the scientiﬁc preoccupations behind it. This movement was the
Marburg School of neo-Kantianism with Hermann Cohen, Paul
Natorp, and Ernst Cassirer.
4. Philosophy and the sciences after Kant.
The twentieth century
4.1. Marburg neo-Kantianism
It was the impressive progress of the physical sciences at the end of
nineteenth century and beginning of twentieth century (from
Maxwell’s electromagnetic theory to Boltzmann’s statistical mech-
anics, from quantum theory to relativity theory) that brought philo-
sophers’ attention back to the problem of knowledge in the distinctive
way in which Kant originally posed it. The return to Kant coincided
with and was prompted by the advances of positive sciences. And the
primary aim of philosophy became that of providing a theory of
knowledge – Erkenntnistheorie – that could encompass the funda-
mental principles of knowledge at work not just in the positive
sciences but also in other domains of human knowledge (from mor-
ality to aesthetics). Erkenntnistheorie became the main focus of the
Marburg School of neo-Kantianism. Starting from what – in typi-
cally Marburgers’ style – they called the ‘fact of science’ (but also
of human culture, more in general), the aim of critical philosophy
was to identify the transcendental principles that make it possible.
At the same time, the Marburg return to critical philosophy was
inevitably ﬁltered through the post-Kantian idealistic tradition. By
contrast with Kant, there is an important residue of idealism in the
Marburg Erkenntnistheorie. The transcendental principles that
make the ‘fact of science’, of art, of human culture possible are pri-
marily ‘ideas’ (or, to use Kant’s terminology, regulative ideas) provid-
ing an open-ended normative goal to philosophical inquiry, and
analysed in their historical unfolding across the history of science,
history of art and of human culture, more in general. By contrast
with Kant, who saw in the interplay of the faculty of sensibility and
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the faculty of understanding (of spatio-temporal intuitions and con-
cepts of the understanding) the key to answer how scientiﬁc knowl-
edge is possible, the neo-kannans Marburgers rejected what to their
eyes appeared as Kant’s semi-psychologistic approach. In their
hands the Marburgers, Kant’s system came out completely trans-
formed, with the faculty of sensibility gone and the faculty of under-
standing being played down in favour of the faculty of reason.
Despite these important differences with respect to the Kantian
system, we owe to Marburg neo-Kantianism the rediscovery of the
Kantian insight about philosophy and the sciences. As Alan
Richardson has nicely put it, for them ‘science serves both as a
resource in the ﬁght against metaphysics and its sceptical antithesis
and as a problem for transcendental philosophy. More precisely,
(. . .) the fact of science explodes scepticism and humbles metaphy-
sics, while the philosophical account of scientiﬁc objectivity
becomes the highest speculative burden of transcendental philos-
ophy’.24 Transcendental philosophy is considered the best safeguard
against the risks of both metaphysics and scepticism, and, at the same
time, as laying down the ‘idealistic’ principles that should account for
scientiﬁc objectivity. The real novelty compared to Kant has to be
found both in the quasi-Naturphilosophisch insistence on the regula-
tive (as opposed to constitutive) principles, and on the quasi-Hegelian
emphasis on the historical unfolding of these principles. In Hermann
Cohen’s pioneering work on the history of analytical mechanics
from Euler to Lagrange,25 as in Ernst Cassirer’s monumental four-
volume Erkenntnistheorie from Galileo to Hegel and modern
times,26 critical philosophy – or better, epistemology intended as
Erkennstnistheorie – was intertwined with both history of philos-
ophy and history of science. And history of science, intended as intel-
lectual history, became an indispensable element to understand the
historical unfolding of the transcendental principles of human
knowledge. As we shall see below, this rediscovery of intellectual
history is a distinctive Marburg feature that many decades later
Thomas Kuhn himself acknowledged as having played a role in his
own conception of the relationship between philosophy of science
and history of science.
The emphasis on regulative over constitutive principles, and on the
historicised unfolding of human thought through an open-ended
series of logico-mathematical structures as a regulative idea of
24 Richardson (2006), p. 216.
25 Cohen (1883).
26 Cassirer (1906–1957).
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reason, is particularly evident in Ernst Cassirer’s so-called ‘genetic’
conception of knowledge.27 Cassirer reinterpreted the Kantian ‘a
priori’ in regulative terms. This reinterpretation of the a priori as a
regulative idea ﬁnds its natural expression in what Cassirer called
the ‘invariants of experience’.28 The a priori no longer denotes that
which is prior to experience in the sense of being the condition of
possibility of experience; but rather that which is the ultimate ‘invar-
iant’ of experience, unattainable at any stage and yet a regulative goal
of scientiﬁc inquiry. This seminal investigation – carried out in
Substance and Function (1910) – was further articulated and explored
in Cassirer’s later books, namely in the one dedicated to the philos-
ophy of the Enlightenment, and in Determinism and Indeterminism
in Modern Physics.
In The philosophy of the Enlightenment (1932), Cassirer offered a
long overdue reappraisal of the Enlightenment conception of scienti-
ﬁc progress and rationality. Against the dogmatic tendency to build
up philosophical systems, the Enlightenment rediscovered the
importance of starting from phenomena. Newton’s method of deduc-
tion from phenomena (paradigmatically deployed in the Principia)
became the gold standard of the Enlightenment ‘systematic spirit’
(esprit syste´matique). Newton’s method does not proceed from con-
cepts and axioms to phenomena, but the other way around: reason
becomes the form of the immanent connection of phenomena. This
is evidently a neo-Kantian reading of the philosophy of the
Enlightenment, a way of linking the philosophical roots of the
Kantian regulative demand to the philosophes’ conception of
‘reason’ and their admiration for Newton’s method. From this per-
spective, Newton’s method of deduction from phenomena comes to
fulﬁl a regulative task: it reveals lawlikeness as immanent in
phenomena.
27 In an interesting study, onwhich I drew here, dedicated to a compari-
son of Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger, Michael Friedman (2000), ch. 6,
has noticed that it is typical of the teleologically oriented ‘genetic’ con-
ception of knowledge of Cassirer (and of the Marburg School, more in
general) to replace Kant’s conception of the constitutive a priori with a
purely regulative idea.
28 ‘From this point of view, the strictly limited meaning of the ‘a priori’
is clearly evident. Only those ultimate logical invariants can be called a
priori, which lie at the basis of any determination of a connection according
to natural law. A cognition is called a priori not in any sense as if it were prior
to experience, but because and insofar as it is contained as a necessary
premise in every valid judgment concerning facts’ Cassirer (1910),
English transl. (1953), 269.
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These ideas were further spelled out in Cassirer’s later book
Determinism and Indeterminism in Modern Physics (1936). According
to Cassirer, modern physics has not given up the salient features of
Kant’s philosophical enterprise. On the contrary, quantum mechanics
has only made evident the fact that Kant’s philosophical apparatus is
to be thought of not as rigid but as dynamic. Hence, ‘the a priori that
can still be sought and that alone can be adhered to must do justice to
this ﬂexibility. It must be understood in a purely methodological
sense. It is not based on the content of any particular system of axioms,
but refers to the process whereby in progressive theoretical research one
system develops from another.’29
I cannot go any further here in an analysis of Cassirer’s
neo-Kantianism. For the purpose of the present paper, it sufﬁces to
note that the relationship between philosophy and the sciences in
the twentieth century changed dramatically with the Marburg
school. It changed in two main ways. First, philosophy of science
was rediscovered once again as a branch of epistemology as
Erkenntnistheorie, along Kant’s original lines. Cassirer’s works on
Galileo, Newton, and quantummechanics testiﬁes to the new impor-
tant role that philosophy of science – intended in theMarburg sense,
and surely not in the current sense – played within general epistem-
ology. Second, philosophy of science as a branch of epistemology
came to be practiced in strict conjunction with both history of philos-
ophy and history of science. The ‘genetic’ conception of knowledge
prompted the Marburgers to look for the conditions of possibility
of human knowledge as historically realised in modern science.
However, the serendipitous combination of epistemology, philos-
ophy of science and history of science achieved by the Marburgers
was not bound to last. The Vienna Circle of Rudolf Carnap,
Moritz Schlick, Hans Hahn, Otto Neurath and Waissman soon
gave a new twist to the relationship between philosophy and the
sciences, which had far-reaching consequences for the way
philosophy of science has been practised in the Anglo-American
world since.
4.2. Rudolf Carnap
Among the Vienna Circle, Rudolf Carnap is surely one of the ﬁgures
that owed most to Marburg neo-Kantianism. As Friedman has
29 Cassirer (1936), Eng. trans. (1956), 74, emphasis added.
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illuminatingly reconstructed,30 Carnap studied with the neo-Kantian
Bruno Bauch in Jena. He read Kant and neo-Kantians, and many
references to Cassirer’s Substance and Function can be found both
in his early works, including his dissertation Der Raum (1922), and
in Der logische Aufbau der Welt (1928). In this latter work, Carnap
tried to synthesize the Marburg ‘genetic’ conception of knowledge
with the positivistic faith in a rock bottom level of empirically
given sense data (without yet falling back to Kant’s faculty of sensi-
bility, or to any phenomenalistic foundationalism a` la Ernst Mach).
But the neo-Kantianism that reached Carnap had been ﬁltered
through the logicism of Frege and Russell, and through the idea
that what Kant thought was pure mathematics is in fact only a
branch of logic (and hence analytic a priori, rather than synthetic a
priori).
Following up on Frege’s logicism that showed that mathematics is
not synthetic a priori, Carnap rejected the Kantian idea that
Euclidean geometry is the result of pure intuition. Instead, for
Carnap what geometry we choose is an entirely conventional matter
(following the path originally opened by Helmholtz and later
explored by Poincare´). While for Kant, space, time and causality
are a priori given and hence constitutive of the object of experience,
for Carnap what type of spatio-temporal-causal structure (what in a
pre-Aufbau terminology he referred to as ‘secondary world’) we
pick out is entirely conventional. What is necessary and not conven-
tional is what Carnap called the positivistic ‘primary world’ of
immediately given sense experience.31
This fundamental level of immediately given sense experience pro-
vides the foundations for Carnap’s project of a ‘constitutional system’
in the Aufbau, namely for what – with Kantian terminology –
Carnap calls the ‘constitution of reality’. The key idea is to replace
Cassirer’s ‘genetic’ conception of knowledge, and hence Cassirer’s
idea of a sequence of historically given mathematical-physical struc-
tures as a regulative idea, with an alternative sequence of increasingly
more abstract logical-mathematical structures, as given to each cogni-
tive subject starting from his/her own sense experience. The idea is to
ultimately ground the objectivity of knowledge by embedding sub-
jective sense data into an overarching and intersubjectively valid hier-
archy of logical structures. It is in this speciﬁc sense that the Aufbau
was meant to reconcile the positivistic faith in the empirically given
with the logical idealism of the Marburg School. The ﬁnal result, in
30 Friedman (1999), ch. 6, and (2000), ch. 5, on which I draw here.
31 Carnap (1924). See on this point Friedman (2000), 69.
296
Michela Massimi
Friedman’s words, was the transformation of ‘neo-Kantian tradition
into something essentially new: ‘logical-analytic’ philosophy.’32
The most important consequence of this ‘logicization’ of the
Marburg School is, in Friedman’s words, that ‘epistemology (. . .)
is transformed into a logical-mathematical constructive project. . . .
This formal exercise is to serve as a replacement for traditional epis-
temology.’33 Carnap’s project dissolved traditional epistemological
debates, such as the debate between idealism and realism, into the
Aufbau ‘constitutional system’. Thanks to a neutral common basis
of formal logic underlying the construction of reality, and thanks to
physicalism (i.e. the belief in a physical basis to which ultimately
all scientiﬁc concepts are logically reducible) all epistemological
and metaphysical disputes could be dissolved.
Yet the problem with Carnap’s ‘constitutional system’ is that by
pushing Kant’s Copernican turn to its extreme limits, and by
showing that our scientiﬁc knowledge is objective thanks to its being
reducible to a series of logical-mathematical structures, Carnap was in
fact not only dissolving traditional epistemological and metaphysical
disputes. He was also dissolving epistemology as Erkenntnistheorie
and replacing it with philosophy of science intended – in a positivist
way – as a logical-mathematical exercise (along the lines of Frege’s
Begriffsschrift, Russell’s Principles of Mathematics, and Wittgenstein’s
Tractatus).
This is the point where, in the history of twentieth-century philos-
ophy, epistemology – intended asErkenntnistheory – and philosophy
of science parted their ways, after the short-lived re-union operated
by the Marburg School. And this is where we come from, almost
eighty years after the Aufbau. As I see it, a rather large portion of
current philosophy of science seems in some relevant respect still
under the logical positivist spell of practicing their subject as
detached from epistemology, intended in the original Kantian and
neo-Kantian sense as a theory of knowledge. Be it Bayesian networks
or decision theory; be it Everettian philosophy of physics or natural
kinds in philosophy of biology, most of the current debates in philos-
ophy of science have, on the one hand, revived the epistemological
and metaphysical disputes that Carnap’s ‘constitutional system’ was
meant to dissolve; on the other hand, they have also engendered a spe-
ciation of subﬁelds in philosophy of science, which seem to have lost
sight of their origins. Not only have they lost sight of the problem of
knowledge that triggeredKant’s epistemological naturalism, but they
32 Friedman (1999), 141. See also Richardson (1998).
33 Friedman (2000), 82.
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have also lost sight of the historical dimension that Marburg
neo-Kantianism brought to this problem. Two main episodes in
the history of twentieth-century philosophy are primarily responsible
for this speciation, in my opinion.
The ﬁrst episode is of course the failure of Carnap’s project by its
own means, as pointed out by Quine’s compelling criticism. Quine’s
criticism of logical positivism, and in particular his critique of
Carnap’s notion of analyticity34 constituted ultimately an attack to
the Kantian notion of a priori as the blueprint of Carnap’s ‘consti-
tutional’ project. In ‘Carnap and Logical Truth’,35 Quine attacked
Carnap’s reformulation of a priori knowledge in terms of stipulations
or conventions: being ‘constitutive’ of the meanings of some terms of
a linguistic framework (in Carnap’s conventionalist sense) does not
per se imply being immune from revision, according to Quine’s
holism. At the same time, Quine is responsible for a revival of natur-
alism in epistemology in the 1960s.36 Epistemology is no longer
regarded as a transcendental enterprise, as it was for Kant and the
neo-Kantians, for whom the primary aim of epistemology is to
answer how scientiﬁc knowledge is possible. Under Quine, natura-
lised epistemology becomes a branch of psychology.
But even more interesting for the purpose of my paper and of my
analysis of the relationship between science and philosophy, is the
second episode in the history of twentieth-century philosophy. An
attempt to recover the neo-Kantian sensitivity to history of science,
without however recovering also the underlying epistemological
motivation, took place in the 1960s, when Thomas Kuhn launched
his anti-positivistic trend in philosophy of science, to which I
now turn.
4.3. Thomas Kuhn
If the early signs of the divorce of philosophy of science from epis-
temology (intended as Erkenntnistheorie) were already evident with
the Vienna Circle, the real divorce was complete in the 1960s. With
the works of Thomas Kuhn, a new era began for philosophy of
science. While philosophy of science rediscovered the importance
of history of science, it also expressly rejected normative epistem-
ology as an inquiry into the conditions of possibility of scientiﬁc
34 Quine (1951). For the Carnap–Quine debate see Creath (1990).
35 Quine (1963).
36 Quine (1969).
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knowledge. Whereas Carnap’s ‘constitutional system’ in the Aufbau
still retained some link with the Kantian and neo-Kantian epistemo-
logical tradition, although it ended up replacing epistemological dis-
putes with a logical analysis of language; by contrast, Kuhn’s
philosophy of science dissolved any normative analysis of how scien-
tists acquire knowledge and replaced it with a historical-sociological
analysis of what scientists did and believed. Kuhn broke once
and for all the link between philosophy of science and epistemology,
by rejecting the idea that epistemology has any normative function
in an attempt to understand the growth of scientiﬁc knowledge.
In so doing, Kuhn broke once and for all with the Kantian and
neo-Kantian tradition of epistemological naturalism that we have
examined so far. With Kuhn’s philosophy of science, naturalism is
brought to its extreme consequences: philosophy of science should
not investigate the problem of knowledge as it may manifest itself
in the sciences. Instead, philosophy of science becomes a chapter of
history of science, and (even more so after Kuhn) a chapter of soci-
ology of science. What Kitcher portrays as Kuhn’s ‘radical natural-
ism’37 originates from his ﬁrm opposition to logical positivism.
In the 1960s, Thomas Kuhn was one of the very ﬁrst to voice a
concern about the neglect of history of science, which he ascribed pri-
marily to the logical positivist tradition, and one of the ﬁrst to advo-
cate an integration of philosophy of science with history of science.
Interestingly enough, he appealed to the neo-Kantian tradition for
this integration and for the rediscovery of the historical dimension
in philosophy of science: ‘There have been philosophers of science,
usually those with a vaguely neo-Kantian cast, from whom historians
can still learn a great deal. I do urge my students to read Emile
Meyerson and sometimes Leon Brunschvicg. But I recommend
these authors for what they saw in historical materials not for their
philosophies, which I join most of my contemporaries in rejecting’.38
Kuhn acknowledges here his debt to the historicised philosophy of
science typical of neo-Kantianism, stripped of any underlying epis-
temological claim. To his eyes, the main contribution of
neo-Kantianism has to be found in the important role ascribed to
the history of science, not in the underlying epistemological
program or in the way in which that program engendered a new
wave of philosophy of science. Kuhn rejected Cassirer’s philosophy
of science as much as he rejected Carnap’s philosophy of science,
37 Kitcher (1992).
38 T. Kuhn ‘The relations between the history and the philosophy of
science’, in Kuhn (1977), 11.
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albeit for different reasons. He rejected the former because of its link
with Erkenntnistheorie and its normative role. He rejected positivist
philosophy of science, on the other hand, because of its lack of histori-
cal dimension.
And to positivist philosophy of science, Kuhn opposed a new ‘phil-
osophy of science’ that he himself forged and for which history of
science may be all the more relevant: this is the philosophical area
that Kuhn himself developed with his view on scientiﬁc revolutions,
paradigm-shift, and incommensurability in The Structure of
Scientiﬁc Revolutions (1962). The only philosophy of science that
can be happily wedded with history of science is a new philosophy
of science that has little in common with positivist philosophy of
science. Kuhn the historian had to create a brand new philosophy of
science to reconcile it with history of science.
In sum, Kuhn could achieve a reconciliation between history and
philosophy of science at the cost of 1) rediscovering the historical sen-
sitivity typical of neo-Kantianism, suitably stripped of any under-
lying epistemological motivations; 2) creating a brand new,
anti-positivist philosophy of science for which history could be of
some relevance. Is this a cheap price to pay? I think the answer is
no, and indeed within the philosophy of science community, many
have never accepted the Kuhnian revolution. The divide remains
between those that have embraced Kuhn’s lesson and try to do a his-
torically informed philosophy of science, and those that following the
positivist tradition are still mainly concerned with logical analyses.
We have identiﬁed then twomain episodes in the twentieth century
that mark respectively the divorce of philosophy of science from epis-
temology (namely, Carnap’s logical positivism), and the subsequent
divorce of HPS from philosophy of science (with Thomas Kuhn).
What these two episodes have in common is the rejection of the
Kantian and neo-Kantian program of tackling the problem of knowl-
edge by taking the sciences as exemplars of human knowledge.
Namely, what both positivist philosophy of science and Kuhnian
HPS share is the view that the sciences cannot really help us answer
the problem of knowledge in the sense of identifying the conditions
of possibility of human knowledge. On the other hand, sciences can
be all the more important in tackling metaphysical problems about
space-time, or reductionism in philosophy of biology, or superveni-
ence in philosophy of mind. The detachment of the sciences from
the normative role of epistemology as Kant and the neo-Kantians
saw it is the distinctive feature of our era, in my view.
I have now ﬁnally reached the end of my historical survey of
the troubled marriage between philosophy and the sciences after
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Kant. I believe that the current situation in history and philosophy
of science is just the last episode of this rather long and troubled
marriage between philosophy and the sciences that began after
Kant. I would like to conclude this paper by foreshadowing
possible future directions of research for the ﬁeld of history and
philosophy of science that somehow take their inspiration precisely
from Kant.
5. Conclusion. What future for history and philosophy of
science after Kuhn? The Kantian legacy
I want to conclude by urging philosophers of science to go beyond
Kuhn. In order to reconcile history and philosophy of science,
Kuhn created in fact a new sub-discipline within philosophy of
science itself, known as HPS. He set his own philosophical agenda,
with his manifesto of scientiﬁc revolutions, incommensurability,
and theory-choice. He clearly and expressly took his distance from
positivistic philosophy of science, and identiﬁed new problems and
new challenges for philosophers of science to address. By contrast
with Kuhn, I think that we do not need to set a separate agenda for
a historically informed philosophy of science: we do already have a
philosophical agenda with a series of compelling and still open ques-
tions (from conﬁrmation to scientiﬁc explanation; from underdeter-
mination to laws of nature; from causality to foundational issues in
physics and biology, among many others). Those questions have
traditionally been regarded as falling in the province of logical ana-
lyses dear to positivist philosophy of science. They have been
regarded as questions that can be addressed in purely analytical,
logical terms without any need to engage with history of science.
I think that the future of HPS as an integrated discipline consists
in showing that those questions do not belong exclusively to the
positivist province and can more proﬁtably be addressed by paying
due attention to history of science.
But I urge to go beyond Kuhn also in another sense. I think we are
still under the Carnapian and Kuhnian spell in thinking that philos-
ophy of science should not only be detached from epistemology, but
should in fact replace it. My vision of HPS is different. I see history
and philosophy of science as integral part of the overarching norma-
tive function of epistemology. The practice of history and philosophy
of science, as I see it, is inherent the meliorative project of epistem-
ology. That is why I believe that the current risk that HPS runs of
being increasingly isolated from philosophy is not just to be
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blamed on post-Fregean epistemology, but is to be blamed also on
Kuhn’s radical naturalism that has broken the link between philos-
ophy of science and epistemology intended in the Kantian way. My
hope is that HPS will eventually rediscover Kantian epistemological
naturalism as the family to which it naturally belongs: we do history
and philosophy of science because we are ultimately interested in
addressing the problem of how we can and indeed do have scientiﬁc
knowledge, and why we do have developed such a surprisingly suc-
cessful science across centuries. In a truly Kantian spirit, I believe
that current history and philosophy of science should rediscover its
Kantian epistemological soul (to echo a recent paper by Alan
Richardson).
Only in this way, can we hope to bridge the gap between philos-
ophy and the sciences that opened wide after Kant. I am not
suggesting that like Kant, we should provide a justiﬁcation for cur-
rently accepted scientiﬁc theories. Nor am I, of course, suggesting
that we have to dust the Kantian apparatus of a priori forms of sensi-
bility and categories of the understanding. I am suggesting instead
that any inquiry into the foundations of space-time, or the nature
of causation, or living organisms in philosophy of biology, should
be addressed and pursued in such a way as to make the question
‘how is scientiﬁc knowledge possible?’ at least meaningful (if not
answerable). This particular way of reconciling the practice of
history and philosophy of science with the Kantian epistemological
tradition has been revived in recent times, thanks to the contributions
of Gerd Buchdahl, among the ﬁrst in the 1960s, and more recently
Michael Friedman, Robert DiSalle, Thomas Ryckman, Roberto
Torretti, Margaret Morrison, among many others.
Gerd Buchdahl was one of the ﬁrst in the 1960s to voice the neces-
sity of a return to Kant in the treatment of philosophy of science with
his marvellous book Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science
(1969a). In more recent years, Michael Friedman has been one of
the main advocates of the necessity to rediscover not only Kant’s
own philosophy of science, but most importantly, Kant’s epistemo-
logical project and its relevance to twenty-ﬁrst century history and
philosophy of science, despite the widespread prejudice that
modern science has proved Kant wrong. In the Kant lectures deliv-
ered at Stanford University and published as The dynamics of
reason (2001), Friedman addresses the very delicate and controversial
issue of showing how Kant’s epistemology can still be fruitfully
applied to twentieth-century science. In particular, he set the ambi-
tious task of reconciling Kuhn’s view of scientiﬁc revolutions with
Kant’s idea that there are some constitutive a priori elements deﬁning
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the conditions of possibility of experience as displayed by any scien-
tiﬁc theory. By relativising those constitutive a priori elements to
different theoretical frameworks, Friedman argues that it is possible
to accept the Kuhnian picture of science as a sequence of scientiﬁc
revolutions and paradigm shifts, while at the same time maintaining
the Kantian insight that what makes our scientiﬁc knowledge of
nature possible is precisely the presence of some constitutively a
priori elements within each theory.
The key idea of Friedman’s dynamic Kantianism consists then in
relativising Kant’s notion of a priori. Friedman refers back to Hans
Reichenbachs Theory of Relativity and A Priori Knowledge (1920),
suggesting that we should distinguish between two possiblemeanings
of the term ‘a priori’ in Kant: namely 1) ﬁxed and unrevisable, and 2)
constitutive of the object of experience. According to Reichenbach,
modern physics has only proved the ﬁrst meaning wrong, while the
second can be maintained and applied to modern scientiﬁc theories
such as relativity theory. As such, we can keep on using Kant’s
notion of a priori even for twentieth-century physics. The a priori
becomes relativised: it maintains its constitutive function, while at
the same time it is allowed to change with time and to become relative
so as to make room for scientiﬁc revolutions. This is what Friedman
calls the ‘relativised a priori’: it is a signiﬁcant change compared to
Kant, but in a way it allows to reconcile Kant’s epistemological
project with some modern visions of science.
Accordingly, Friedman claims that we should regard mature the-
ories in science such as Newtonian mechanics or special relativity
or general relativity as consisting of two distinct parts: (1) a properly
empirical part, containing empirical laws such as Newton’s law of
gravitation, or Maxwell’s equations of electromagnetism in special
relativity (SR), or Einstein’s equations for the gravitational ﬁeld in
general relativity (GR); and (2) a constitutively a priori part containing
both the relevant mathematical principles used in formulating
the theory (Euclidean geometry; Minkowski space-time in SR;
Riemannian theory of manifolds in GR) and certain fundamental
physical principles (Newton’s laws of motion in Newtonian mech-
anics, the light principle of SR, the equivalence principle of GR).
The claim is that even if the elements of part (2) (i.e. both mathemat-
ical and physical principles) can and typically do change in the history
of science through scientiﬁc revolutions, nonetheless they still retain
their Kantian constitutive a priori character in making possible the
empirical part (1) of the theory.
Friedman points out that the scientiﬁc revolutions of twentieth
century have made even more clear the constitutive function of a
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priori principles in Kantian terms, and have even more emphasised
the distinction between those constitutively a priori elements, on
the one hand, and the properly empirical part of the theory, on the
other hand. The scientiﬁc revolution that Einstein brought about
with general relativity, for example, has made even more evident
the need of ﬁnding constitutive principles as coordinating between
an increasingly more abstract mathematical framework, on the one
hand, and empirical phenomena, on the other hand. Instead of
Euclidean three-dimensional space, we now have a four-dimensional
Riemannianmanifold of variable curvature. In place of inertial trajec-
tories of Newtonian mechanics, we now have the four-dimensional
geodesics of the Riemannian metric. In place of Newton’s law of
gravitation, we now have Einstein’s ﬁeld equations which relate the
four dimensional space-time metric with the stress-energy tensor.
Hence, there is an increasing need for principles of coordination
mediating between the abstract mathematical structures and concrete
physical phenomena. In the case of general relativity for instance, the
equivalence principle coordinates the four-dimensional Riemannian
geodesic paths with the concrete phenomena of free falling particles
in a gravitational ﬁeld. Friedman claims that the equivalence prin-
ciple in GR and the light principle in SR have exactly the same coor-
dinating function that Newton’s laws of motion have in the context of
Newtonian mechanics. And like Newton’s laws of motion, they too
are fundamental mathematical-physical presuppositions without
which the properly empirical laws of the new theory (namely,
Maxwell’s equations for the electromagnetic ﬁeld in special relativity;
and Einstein’s equations for the gravitational ﬁeld in general relativ-
ity) have no empirical meaning or application at all.
Against Quine’s holism, Friedman then goes on to claim that it is a
big mistake to confuse the mathematical-physical part of a theory
with the properly empirical part. While we can subject to experiment
the latter, we cannot subject to experiment the former. For instance,
despite the fact that Riemannian manifolds can be used to formulate
both general relativity and a version of classical mechanics, we cannot
say that we can test Riemannianmanifolds in either of these two differ-
ent theories, because Riemannian manifolds provide instead the con-
ditions of possibility of either of the two theories and as such cannot
be tested in either of them. Riemmanian manifolds together with
some fundamental principles such as the equivalence principle in
general relativity cannot be subject to experiment or modiﬁed because
they play a fundamental constitutive function within relativity theory.
In my book Pauli’s Exclusion Principle (2005), I have latched onto
Friedman’s dynamic Kantianism by providing an analysis of a
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scientiﬁc principle, namely Pauli’s exclusion principle. Discovered in
1924 by the Austrian Nobel laureate Wolfgang Pauli, the principle
excludes the possibility in nature of two electrons, two protons and
in general two fermions being in the same dynamic state, and as
such it explains a wide array of phenomena such as the stability of
matter at the level of galaxies as well as the dynamics of coloured
quarks at the subatomic level, among others. I wanted to understand
how a scientiﬁc principle, such as this one, originates and whether or
not it could play a constitutive a priori role like the one that Friedman
ascribes it to other scientiﬁc principles. I then reconstructed in some
historical and physical detail the origins of Pauli’s principle in the
history of early quantum theory and its evolution with the develop-
ment of quantum statistics in 1926 and later quantum ﬁeld theory
and quantum chromodynamics in the 1960s. The history of Pauli’s
principle was in my intention functional to addressing the philoso-
phical question of what a scientiﬁc principle is, and more in general
the epistemological question of how our scientiﬁc knowledge of
nature – as displayed byQM (and Pauli’s principle in it) – is possible.
Inmymonograph, I drew attention to a different perspective about
scientiﬁc principles, one that is still dynamicallyKantian in consider-
ing them as relative and revisable, and yet is not distinctively
Reichenbachian in identifying them with constitutive a priori prin-
ciples ‘coordinating’ the mathematical with the proper empirical
part of a scientiﬁc theory. The history of Pauli’s exclusion principle
lent itself naturally to this alternative perspective, which latches
onto Friedman’s by highlighting the complementary, regulative
Kantian aspect. The upshot of my monograph was to show that an
empirical and contingent rule such as Pauli’s 1924 exclusion rule
attained lawlikeness and necessity because of the systematizing role
it played in the quantum mechanics framework, whereby systemati-
city is not just a desirable feature of scientiﬁc knowledge. Rather, in
a truly Kantian spirit, systematicity as a regulative principle under-
pins the possibility itself of identifying empirical regularities as
lawlike. It is only the systematizing role that an empirical regularity
plays within a body of knowledge that transforms it into a fundamen-
tal law of nature. This approach has the advantage of doing justice to
the revisable and experimentally testable nature of Pauli’s principle as
much as it grounds its nomological validity on the degree of empirical
support it receives within quantum mechanics.
I have lingered on Friedman’s dynamic Kantianism and my own
more recent work simply because they represent a possible way
(albeit not the only one) of developing history and philosophy of
science along the epistemological lines that Kant originally traced.
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Or better, they represent a possible way of practising history and phil-
osophy of science in such a way that the underlying epistemological
question ‘how is scientiﬁc knowledge possible?’ remains at least
meaningful. But many other ways are possible and need to be
explored in future research.
To sum up and conclude, I think we should resist two opposite and
similarly dangerous temptations. The ﬁrst is the temptation to make
philosophy of science a branch of science itself, where philosophy
risks becoming a footnote at the end of a theorem, be it in decision
theory or philosophy of physics. Let us leave the sciences to the scien-
tists and content ourselves as philosophers with the perennial
problem of understanding how we could reach scientiﬁc knowledge
in the ﬁrst place. The second is the opposite temptation of leaving
those epistemological questions to the epistemologists, as if an
answer to the problem of knowledge should necessarily pertain to
the exclusive domain of epistemology as is practised nowadays in ana-
lytic philosophy. If philosophy of science has lost its Kantian epis-
temological soul, similarly current epistemology seems to have in
part lost its scientiﬁc soul in trying to pursue those important ques-
tions beside and beyond any scientiﬁc preoccupation.
Kant opened the path by producing an epistemology that was
informed by the scientiﬁc preoccupations of his time. The burden
now is on us to explore the path further and to venture uncharted terri-
tories, even if the pathmaywell be rocky and ultimately open-ended.Or
better, it is precisely because the path is probably open-ended that the
inquiry into the relationship between philosophy and the sciences can
and must go on, after Kant, and despite all the limits of Kant’s project.
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